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under one polynomial time reduction, it can be deemed that the security mechanism of such problem is safe.
Bellare-Rogaway formalized analysis model is a common formalized analysis method. The model is established on a hypothesis that the attacker controls the whole communication network, the protocol participants don't communicate directly, but take attacker as the communication medium [7] . Attacker can read, create, revise, delay and reset all the communication information in the protocol, sponsor a new round of identification conversation, and imitate the operation of state machine of any protocol participants. When the operation of security protocol comes an end, the communication entity of participating in security authentication could obtain a totally identical secret key, while attack can only participate in the protocol authentication process by means of transmitting the method of authentication information loyally (namely benign attacker). Then, it is deemed that the protocol is safe enough.
The formalized analysis of the model security can be divided into the following three steps:
Step 1: Model the participant's and attacker's behaviors of formalized protocol; step 2: formalized security target;
Step 2: formalized proving of the reduction of a polynomial time, reducing the attack to a given target to an unsolvable difficulty.
is used for formalized authentication of protocol participant.
Hereinto, is security parameter, are k ∈ N and i ∈ I are the mark of sponsor, j ∈ I is the mark of responder, a ∈ {0,1}*is the security information, and k ∈ {0,1}* is the information cascade interacted at present, and r ∈ { } ∞ 1 0， is the random input of sender. I is a set, and the elements of the set are all the participants that can participate in these protocols. Attacker E doesn't belong to the participant ( ∉ I) of protocol, II function can execute end during polynomial time.
The reaction form of authentication protocol participant
, where, m ∈ {0,1}*  {*}is the information to be input, δ ∈ {Accept,Reject,No-Decide} is the decision made by the authentication protocol participant, and t ∈ {0,1}*  {*}is the secret information obtained by the participatn.
Suppose protocol P has R rounds of message interaction (R is an odd number, and 2t-1=R), the time of the ith round mutual information is τ = i τ . In each authentication protocol process, for all the i<j, i τ < j τ is true (that is the ith round of information interaction occurs before the jth round of information interaction). If the conversation sequence k and k ′ conforms to the following requirement:
The prefix of k is
The prefix of k ′ is
Then, it is deemed that conversation sequence k and k ′ is a pair of matched conversation sequence. If both parties of protocol participant own a pair of matched conversation sequence, then the state machine of two protocol participants will turn to the state of trusting the other party. If such two conversations exist, when one party's state machine turns to the state of trusting the other party, but the state machine of the other party doesn't turn to the state of trusting the other party, such two conversations are called abnormal conversion sequence [8] (that is, protocol design Bug results in the occurrence of such case).
When the possibility of a abnormal conversation sequence for a protocol is as small as to be ignorable and the both participants of protocol has matched conversation sequence, the state machines of both protocol participants will turn into the state of trusting the other party. Thus, the protocol is deemed to be safe.
Security Analysis of MACsec Mechanism

General analysis of MACsec
MACSec provides secret key management, identity authentication and access authorization according to IEEE 802.1X standard, while IEEE 802.1X protocol [9] adopts EAP approval standards. EAP doesn't define specific authentication protocol by itself, but uses the authentication interaction provided by the upper layer for identity authentication. Whereas MACSec doesn't provide secrete key management or identity authentication, IEEE 802.1 security panel updated the version of IEEE 802.1X in 2010 so as to support MACSec.
The protocol defined by IEEE 802.1X standard requires presetting a safe communication path between the switching equipment and identity authentication server so as to ensure the safe communication between switching equipment and identity authentication server. Whenever the switching equipment links the network, it requires network administrator to set up security channel, which increases the workload of network administrator and limits the application of MACsec.
In the research, the universal Bellare-Rogaway model was used for formalized analysis of EAP-TLS protocol.
Formalized analysis of MACsec identity authentication
In the research, the security analysis is made for EAP-TLS protocol used by MACsec. The formalized EAP-TLS protocol is shown in Fig. 1 .
Client
Authenticater Server for message m, and pre-master-secret is the same secret key owned by the client and AS authentication server before the running of protocol. Secret key k is a secret key for communication between authenticator and authentication server, so it is used for ensuring the safe communication between them. That is, the authenticator has no essential identity, and it is only taken as a medium of encryption, decryption and transmission, while the identification information is only identified at client side and authentication server, so the three-party protocol should be formalized to the two-party security authentication protocol. 
